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Abstract—In this paper we propose a novel observer-based
method to improve the safety and security of connected and
automated vehicle (CAV) transportation. The proposed method
combines model-based signal filtering and anomaly detection
methods. Specifically, we use adaptive extended Kalman filter
(AEKF) to smooth sensor readings of a CAV based on a nonlinear
car-following model. Using the car-following model the subject
vehicle (i.e., the following vehicle) utilizes the leading vehicle’s
information to detect sensor anomalies by employing previously-
trained One Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) models.
This approach allows the AEKF to estimate the state of a vehicle
not only based on the vehicle’s location and speed, but also
by taking into account the state of the surrounding traffic.
A communication time delay factor is considered in the car-
following model to make it more suitable for real-world appli-
cations. Our experiments show that compared with the AEKF
with a traditional χ2-detector, our proposed method achieves a
better anomaly detection performance. We also demonstrate that
a larger time delay factor has a negative impact on the overall
detection performance.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical systems, Fault diagnosis, Intel-
ligent vehicles, Car-following model, Vehicle safety, Anomaly
detection, Signal filtering
I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous studies within the past decade have focused on
connected and automated vehicle (CAV) technology, which
is considered to be an integral part of the future of the
intelligent transportation system (ITS) field [1]. CAVs have the
potential to transform the ITS field by introducing numerous
safety, mobility, and environmental sustainability benefits. A
CAV system combines connected vehicle (CV) and automated
vehicle (AV) technologies, creating a synergistic impact that
goes well beyond the benefits that each of these technologies
can offer in isolation. It is envisioned that CAVs, with diverse
degrees of connectivity and automation, will lead the path
toward the next generation of transportation systems, which
is more intelligent, efficient, and sustainable [2, 3].
CAVs use wireless technologies to enable communication
and cooperation not only among vehicles but also between ve-
hicles and the transportation infrastructure. By using dedicated
short-range communication (DSRC) [4], or other types of com-
munication technologies, vehicles and roadside units (RSUs)
are able to continuously transmit and receive information such
as speed, position, acceleration, braking status, traffic signal
status, etc., through what is called a Basic Safety Message
(BSM). These communication messages have a range of about
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400 meters and can detect high-risk situations that may not
be observable otherwise due to traffic, terrain, or weather [4].
The CAV technology extends and enhances currently available
crash avoidance systems that use radars and cameras to detect
collision threats by enabling CAVs to warn their surrounding
vehicles of collisions and potentially hazardous circumstances.
In addition, they provide mobility and sustainability benefits
by enabling platoon formation, which can increase road ca-
pacity and reduce fuel consumption. However, as vehicles and
infrastructures become more interconnected and automated,
the vulnerability of their components to faults and/or deliberate
malicious attacks increases. This vulnerability is exacerbated
by the increase in vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I) communications, which increase a vehi-
cle’s external connection interfaces. At the system level, CAVs
and the infrastructure can be viewed as individual nodes in
a large interconnected network, where a single anomaly or
malicious attack can easily propagate through this network, af-
fecting other network components (e.g., other vehicles, traffic
control devices, etc.). Therefore, there is an increasing demand
for cyber security solutions, e.g., anomaly detection methods,
in CAV sensor systems to enhance safety and reliability of
CAVs and the entire network.
Anomaly detection in CAV sensors is an important but also
challenging task. A traveling CAV could use the most recent
history of data to detect anomalies. Presence of an anomaly
in the pattern of data collected from a CAV sensor system
can imply (i) a subset of sensors are faulty, or (ii) there has
been a malicious attack. In both cases, it is vital to detect the
anomalies and exclude the anomalous data from the decision
making process.
An anomaly detection scheme introduces two types of errors
– false negatives and false positives. It is easy to see that a
false negative error can allow falsified data to affect trajectory
planning, which could lead to fatal consequences. Although
less apparent, a false positive error can have consequences that
are just as severe. Consider a situation where an actual event in
the network (e.g., an unexpected braking from a downstream
vehicle) has led to an abrupt change in the pattern of observed
data. If the vehicle falsely detects such an unexpected change
as a fault/attack and discards the information, it may lead to
the CAV not reacting to such abrupt changes in the network
appropriately and in a timely manner, creating dangerous, and
potentially fatal, scenarios. In order to prevent this type of
false positive error, it is necessary for vehicles to incorporate
network-level information in their anomaly detection scheme.
In addition to distinguishing between real changes in net-
work conditions and anomalies, the anomaly detection meth-
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ods should be able to identify the noise introduced by sensors
and the communication channel, exacerbated by potential
communication delay, as well as the missing values in the
collected data. Moreover, due to resource constraints for each
vehicle, the anomaly detection techniques in CAVs need to be
lightweight, and implementable in real-time.
Anomalous sensor behavior could manifest itself in various
forms and representations. Several faulty sensor behaviors are
discussed in [5]. Petit et al. [6] summarize the taxonomy of
intrusions or attacks on automated vehicles, among which the
false injection attack is considered to be the most dangerous
attack. In this paper, we consider five types of the anomalous
sensor behavior resulting from both sensor faults and false
injection attacks. We base this paper on the sensor failure
and/or attack taxonomy provided by Sharma et al. [5] and
Van et al. [7]:
1) Short: A single, sharp and abrupt change in the observed
data between two successive sensor readings.
2) Noise: An increase in the variance of the sensor read-
ings. Different from Short, the Noise anomaly type
occurs across multiple successive sensor readings.
3) Bias: A temporarily constant offset from the sensor
readings.
4) Gradual drift: A small and gradual drift in observed data
during a time period. Over time, a gradual drift can result
in a large discrepancy between the observed and the true
state of the system.
5) Miss: Lack of available data during a time period.
In this paper, we do not explicitly account for ‘miss,’
which can result from DoS attacks preventing the exchange
of information. However, note that ‘miss,’ depending on its
duration, can be viewed as ‘instant’ or ‘bias’ behaviors, where
the sensor reading is non-existent instead of showing a wrong
value. Hence, it can partially be addressed using the same
methods for detecting ‘short’ or ‘bias’ behaviors. For examples
of specific scenarios that could lead to these anomalies, refer
to [8].
In order to successfully detect different types of anomalies,
avoid falsely identifying unexpected changes in the network as
anomalies, and mitigate the impact of random noise/missing
values, we develop a novel and comprehensive framework that
combines the adaptive extended Kalman Filter (AEKF) with
a car following motion model, and employs a data-driven
fault detector. Our framework is capable of accounting for
delay in observing the environment, introduced by a congested
communication channel and/or delayed sensor observation.
Specifically, we use a car-following model to govern the
motion of the vehicle in order to capture the interaction
between the subject vehicle and its immediate leading vehicle.
We demonstrate that the time delay incorporated in the motion
model renders the traditional χ2 fault detector [9] not appropri-
ate for anomaly detection, and propose and implement a One
Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) model for anomaly
detection [10] together with AEKF instead. We demonstrate
the power of the proposed framework in detecting various
types of anomalies.
Our main objective in this study is to detect sensor anoma-
lies and to recover the corrupt signals by utilizing the sur-
rounding vehicles’ information. To this end, the following
assumptions are made:
1) Vehicles move according to a car-following model (i.e.,
under adaptive cruise control mode), have access to
location and velocity of their leader (either through
BSMs or using their on-board sensors), and are able to
control over their own acceleration rates.
2) A known time delay (e.g., communication, sensing,
and/or reaction delay) is applied to the input vector of
the car-following model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides a brief review of the existing related work in the
field of anomaly detection in CAVs. Section III introduces the
formulation of the problem and our method. In section IV we
conduct a case study based on a well-known car-following
model. Finally, in section V, we conclude this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Anomaly detection research has generated a substantial vol-
ume of literature over the past few years, as it is an important
and challenging problem in many disciplines including but not
limited to automotive systems [11, 12], wireless networks [13],
and environmental engineering [14, 15]. Anomaly detection
methods are used in a variety of applications including fault
diagnosis, intrusion detection, and monitoring applications.
In some cases if the source of an anomaly can be quickly
identified, appropriate reconfiguration control actions can be
made in order to avoid or minimize potential loss.
In the past few years, a variety of methods have been
developed to detect anomalous behavior, and/or identify the
source of anomaly [16, 17]. Examples of anomaly detection
methods include observer-based methods [18, 19], parity re-
lation methods [20, 21], and parameter estimation methods
[22], etc. Among them, observer-based (quantitative model-
based) fault detection is a common fault detection approach,
as discussed in [17]. Observer-based fault detection is based
on the residual (or innovation) sequence obtained from using a
mathematical model and (adaptive) thresholding. In this paper
we study anomaly detection in CAVs using observer-based
anomaly detection.
Anomalous sensor behavior in CAVs could result from both
sensor failures or malicious cyber attacks. Sensor readings may
be influenced by a variety of factors, leading to collection of
faulty information [23, 24, 25]. For example, environmental
perturbations and sensor age may result in higher probabilities
of failure. A short circuit, loose wire connection, or low battery
supply are among other reasons that may cause inaccurate data
reporting, including an unexpectedly high variation of sensor
reading, or noise [8].
Additionally, malicious attacks may cause anomaly in sen-
sor readings. CAVs have several internal and external cyber
attack surfaces through which they can be accessed and
compromised by ill-intended actors [6, 23, 26, 27, 28]. Petit
and Shladover [6] showed that false injection of information
and map database poisoning are two of the most dangerous
potential attacks on CAVs. For example, the infrastructure (i.e.,
RSU) or a neighboring vehicles can transmit fake messages
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(e.g., WAVE Service Advertisement, BSM), which may in
turn generate wrong, and potentially harmful, reactions (e.g.,
spurious braking), placing CAV occupants and other road
users in life-threatening situations. There are several existing
studies that illustrate the vulnerability of CAV sensors, e.g.,
speed, acceleration and location sensors, to cyber attacks or
faults. For in-vehicle speed and acceleration sensors, a false
injection attack mentioned in [6] through the CAN bus or the
on-board diagnostics (OBD) system could induce any of the
four types of anomalies considered in this paper. As another
example, Trippel et al. demonstrates that an acoustic injection
attack could lead to anomalous sensor values for the in-vehicle
acceleration sensor [29]. Lastly, for the location measurement
from the GPS, both the operating environment of the vehicle
and GPS spoofing/jamming attacks may result in anomalous
sensor values [30]. Note that in this study we only consider
false injection attacks whose manifestations can be described
by four types of anomaly defined in Section I. As such, the
study leaves out any types of attacks that do not impact sensor
readings.
Despite the severe consequences of failing to detect sensor
anomalies in CAVs, there is a scarcity of anomaly detection
techniques in the ITS literature. Only a limited number of stud-
ies have focused on cyber security in CAVs, or more generally
in ITS. In [31], Park et al. use graph theory based on a transient
fault model to detect transient faults in CAVs. Christiansen
et al. [32] combine background subtraction and convolutional
neural networks to detect anomalies/obstacles. Muter et al.
[11] and Marchetti et al. [33] use entropy-based methods to de-
tect anomalies (attacks) in in-vehicle networks. Faughnan et al.
measure the discrepancy between redundant sensor readings to
detect hijacking in unmanned aerial vehicles [30]. Van Wyk et
al. [7] use a CNN - Kalman Filter - χ2-detector hybrid method
to detect and identify sensor anomaly in a CAV system.
In this paper, we focus on detection of anomalous sensor
readings and recovery of the corrupt signals. We propose an
observer-based anomaly detection method, which combines
a well-known filtering technique, namely, AEKF, to smooth
the CAV sensor values, and a machine learning method, i.e.,
OCSVM, to learn the normal vehicle behavior, with the objec-
tive of detecting anomalous behavior. Specifically, we utilize
a car following model to take into account the information
from the leading vehicle, so as to better detect anomalies by
reducing the false positive error rate. Additionally, to make
our methodology robust to practical network conditions and
improve its anomaly detection performance, we account for
time delay in perceiving the environment, which could arise
from communication delay or sensor observation delay.
One of the major differences of this paper with our past
work is that in [7] we examine multiple sensor readings for
each type of sensor at the same time by feeding multiple sensor
readings into a CNN network. However, in this paper, for each
type of sensor we rely on readings from a single sensor only
and propose a novel anomaly filtering and detection technique
accordingly. Another major difference is that this work takes
into account the state of the leading vehicle when conducting
anomaly detection for the subject vehicle. These two major
differences make the two frameworks fundamentally different,
and applicable to different scenarios. Finally, in this paper we
have replaced the traditional χ2-detector, which was used in
[7], with a OCSVM model. Our experiments show that by
cooperating leading vehicle’s information and using OCSVM,
we achieve a better detection performance compared to the
traditional χ2-detector. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first study that detects CAV sensor anomaly by utilizing
leading vehicle’s information, i.e., by incorporating a car-
following model into a continuous state-space model with time
delay. Additionally, given the fact (demonstrated in the paper)
that the model noise does not follow a Gaussian distribution,
rendering the traditional χ2 test inapplicable, we propose an
OCSVM model in order to deal with the bias and abnormal
distribution of innovation caused by time delay.
III. METHODS
In this section, we first discuss how a car-following model
with time delay can be used to describe the motion (also
known as state-transition) model in AEKF. Next, we formulate
a new continuous nonlinear state-space model with discrete
measurement based on a car-following motion model. The
continuous state-transition model represents the intrinsic na-
ture of a vehicle’s response to the actions of its immediate
downstream traffic, and the discrete measurement model rep-
resents the mechanics of sensor sampling, as is the case in
practice. Based on the proposed state-space model, we propose
an anomaly detection method, which combines AEKF and
OCSVM. Also a traditional χ2-detector is discussed and its
performance is compared with that of OCSVM.
A. Car-Following Model with Time Delay
Consider the car-following model in [34]:
dn(t) = xn−1(t)− xn(t)
d˙n(t) = vn−1(t)− vn(t)
v˙n(t) = f(vn(t− τ), dn(t− τ), d˙n(t− τ))
(1)
where v˙n(t), vn(t), xn(t) are respectively the acceleration,
speed, and location of the nth vehicle, to which we refer as the
‘subject vehicle’, and dn(t) and d˙n(t) are the distance gap and
the speed difference between the subject vehicle and its leading
vehicle, the (n−1)th vehicle, respectively. Parameter τ denotes
time delay, also known as the ‘perception-reaction time’, i.e.,
the period of time lapsed from the moment the leading vehicle
performs an action, to the moment the subject vehicle executes
an action in response. Function f is the stimulus function.
v˙n(t) in Equation (1) can be recast in the following form:
v˙n(t) = f (xn(t− τ), vn(t− τ), xn−1(t− τ), vn−1(t− τ))
(2)
We define a state vector in continuous time as:
sn(t) =
[
xn(t), vn(t)
T
] ∈ R2, (3)
where xn(k) ∈ R and vn(k) ∈ R. Note that, without loss of
generality, x and v can be extended to vector form to allow
for incorporating historical location and speed observations,
respectively, into the state-space model, when desired.
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Recasting equation (2) as a function of sn(t) produces a car
following model that maps the state into an actionable decision
for the subject vehicle:
v˙n(t) :=fvc (sn(t− τ), un(t− τ)) (4)
where un(t) = [xn−1(t), vn−1(t)]T is the input vector con-
taining information received from the leading vehicle, and
fvc denotes the stimulus function describing velocity in a
continuous sate space.
B. Continuous State-Discrete Measurement State-Space
Model
We now define a state-space model with a continuous state-
transition model and discrete measurements. Using previous
definition of the state vector sn(t), the state-transition model
satisfies the following differential equation:
s˙n(t) =
[
x˙n(t)
v˙n(t)
]
=
[
eT2 sn(t)
fvc(sn(t− τ), un(t− τ))
]
.
(5)
where e2 = [0, 1]T .
When τ = 0, the state-space model in equation (5) satisfies
the Markovian property, allowing for applying AEKF. How-
ever, in practice, a variety of factors including time required
for data processing and computations as well as delays in the
communication network can cause τ to be non-zero. As such,
in practice AEKF cannot be applied to equation (5), since
the derivative of the state vector is determined by multiple
previous state vectors.
In order to apply AEKF, we approximate equation (5) in the
following way: We assume the acceleration of each vehicle
is bounded within the interval [amin, amax], where amin ≤
0 and amax > 0 indicate the magnitude of the maximum
deceleration and acceleration rates, respectively. Based on the
assumption of bounded acceleration, we can obtain lower and
upper bounds on the approximation of vn(t):
eT2 sn(t− τ) + aminτ ≤ vn(t) ≤ eT2 sn(t− τ) + amaxτ.
Then a delay differential equation (DDE), describing the
delayed state-transition model, can be used to approximate
equation (5):
s˙n(t) =
[
x˙n(t)
v˙n(t)
]
=
[
eT2 sn(t− τ) +
´ t
t−τ an(r)dr
fvc(sn(t− τ), un(t− τ))
]
≈
[
eT2 sn(t− τ)
fvc(sn(t− τ), un(t− τ))
]
= gsc(sn(t− τ), un(t− τ))
(6)
where an(t) is the acceleration of the nth vehicle at time t,
and gsc denotes the derivative of the continuous-time state
space. Finally, we obtain a continuous-time state-transition
model with discrete-time measurement as the following:
s˙n(t) = gsc(sn(t− τ), un(t− τ)) + θ(t)
zn(tk) = h(sn(tk)) + η(tk), k ∈ {0 ∪ Z+}
(7)
where h(·) is the measurement function, zn(·) denotes sensor
reading of the nth vehicle, θ(t) and η(tk) are the process noise
and the observation noise, respectively, which are assumed to
be mutually independent, tk+1 = tk + ∆t, k ∈ {0∪Z+}, and
∆t is the sampling time interval for sensors. Note that θ(t)
accounts for the error introduced by the approximation steps
in equation (6).
C. Adaptive Extended Kalman Filter with Fault Detector
Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) is a well-established method
used for timely and accurate estimation of the dynamic state
of a non-linear system [35]. One important issue that needs to
be addressed in EKF is how to properly set up the covariance
matrices of process noise (i.e., Q) and measurement noise (i.e.,
R). The performance of EKF is highly affected by proper
tuning of Q and R [36], while in practice these parameters
are usually unknown a priori. Therefore, we apply an adaptive
extended Kalman filter (AEKF) to approximate these matrices.
An EKF is used to estimate state vector sn(tk) from sensor
reading zn(tk). Let sˆ(k|k − 1) and P (tk|tk−1) denote the
state prediction and state covariance prediction at time tk,
given the estimate at time tk−1, respectively. Note that for
ease of notation, we omit subscript n. Hence, considering the
state-space model in equation (15), the EKF consists of the
following 3 steps:
Step 0 - Initialize: To initialize EKF, the mean values and
covariance matrix of the states are set up at k = 0 as the
following:
sˆk|k−1 = E[s(t0)]
Pk|k−1 = Var[s(t0)].
(8)
Step 1 - Predict: The state and its covariance matrix at tk−1
are projected one step forward in order to obtain the a priori
estimates at time tk,
Solve
{
˙ˆs(t) = gsc(sˆ(t− τ), u(t− τ)),
P˙ (t) = F (t− τ)P (t− τ) + P (t− τ)F (t− τ)T +Q(t)
with
{
sˆ(tk−1) = sˆk−1|k−1
P (tk−1) = Pk−1|k−1
⇒
{
sˆk|k−1 = sˆ(tk)
Pk|k−1 = P (tk)
(9)
where F (t− τ) = ∂gsc∂s |sˆ(t−τ),u(t−τ) is the first-order approx-
imation of the Jacobian matrix of function gsc(·).
Step 2 - Update:
νk = z(tk)− h(sˆk|k−1)
Sk = H(tk)Pk|k−1H(tk)T +Rk
Kk = Pk|k−1H(tk)TS
−1
k
sˆk|k = sˆk|k−1 +Kkνk
Pk|k = Pk|k−1 −KkH(tk)Pk|k−1
(10)
where H(tk) = ∂h∂s |sˆk|k−1 , Q(t) is the covariance matrix of the
process noise at time t, Rk = R(tk) is the covariance matrix
of the measurement noise at time tk, and νk is innovation (i.e.,
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the difference between the measurement and the prediction) at
time tk.
Since in practice Q and R are usually unknown, based on
the work in [37] with slight modifications, we apply an AEKF
to estimate these two matrices by using a moving estimation
window of size M , as follows:
µk = z(tk)− h(sˆk|k)
Rˆk =
M∑
i=1
λi
(
µk−i+1 µTk−i+1
+H(tk−i+1)Pk−i+1|k−i+1H(tk−i+1)T
)
Qˆk =
M∑
i=1
λiKk−i+1νk−i+1νTk−i+1Kk−i+1
(11)
where µk is the residual at time tk, which is the difference
between actual measurement and its estimated value using
the information available at time tk, {λi, i = 1, 2, ...,M} are
forgetting factors, and
∑M
i=1 λi = 1. Note that using a moving
window, as we place more weight on previous estimates, less
fluctuation of Rˆk and Qˆk will incur, and it takes longer for
the model to capture changes in the system. Additionally, note
that we replace Q(t) in equation (9) with Qˆk during the time
interval [tk−1, tk].
One of the traditional fault detectors used in conjunction
with Kalman filter is the χ2-detector [9, 38, 39]. Since AEKF
is a special type of Kalman filter, the χ2-detector can be
seamlessly applied to AEKF as well. Specifically, it constructs
χ2 test statistics to determine whether the new measurement
falls into the gate region with the probability determined by
the gate threshold σ, as shown in the following:
Vγ(k) = {z :(z − zˆk|k−1)TS−1k (z − zˆk|k−1) ≤ σ}. (12)
where zˆk|k−1 is the predicted value of measurement at time
tk. The χ2 test statistics for the fault detector is defined as
χ2(tk) = ν
T
k S
−1
k νk. (13)
For the χ2 test to provide meaningful results, the innovation
νk should be zero mean Gaussian distributed with covariance
Sk. However, in reality, the innovation can follow a non-zero
mean Gaussian distribution if there is bias in the background
(e.g., due to non-zero mean process noise or imperfect model),
as shown in figure 1. This figure displays a scatter plot of nor-
malized innovation generated from the training dataset in our
experiments, when there exits a time delay and
´ t
t−τ an(r)dr
in equation (6) is not zero. Moreover, in practice the variance
of the normalized innovation is not normally distributed when
the noise does not follow a Gaussian distribution. In the 2-
dimensional case, the χ2-detector defines a circular boundary
with its center located at (0, 0), i.e., the blue lines in figure
1, which corresponds to the thresholding boundary of the χ2-
detector with σ = 2.5. Therefore, in order to correctly detect
anomalies, the χ2-detector requires the data to be zero mean
and normally distributed. In such a scenario, the χ2-detector
would not be a good detector since it will generate higher rates
of false positives and false negatives. As such, the boundary
should be shifted toward the true mean in order to achieve a
‘fair’ boundary on both sides.
Fig. 1: An example where the normalized innovation sequence is not zero mean due to
time delay and imperfect model, where τ = 0.5 second. The threshold σ of χ2-detector
is 2.5.
In the context of our problem, the approximation introduced
in equation (6) can generate such a bias. This approximation
assumes the value
´ t
t−τ an(r)dr to be zero. As such, unless the
acceleration and deceleration rates during the period [t , t+τ ]
sum to zero, or the time delay τ is equal to zero, the result-
ing bias would degrade the performance of the χ2-detector.
Consequently, we propose a novel approach to use one-class
support vector machines (OCSVMs) [10] to adaptively learn
the normal boundary of the innovation sequence. Specifically,
we train several OCSVM models using normal (i.e., non-
anomalous) sensor data with different parameter values (i.e.,
anomaly percentages). We use the trained OCSVM models for
detecting anomalies in real-time.
D. One Class Support Vector Machine
Let us define normalized innovation ν¯ at time tk as:
ν¯(tk) = S
− 12
k · νk (14)
Assume we have a training set N , with l data points,
ν¯(t1), ..., ν¯(tl) ∈ N , sampled from a normal (i.e., non-
anomalous) set. Let us define Φ as a kernel mapping function
N → F . OCSVM solves the following quadratic program:
min
ω∈F,ξ∈Rl,ρ∈R
1
2
||ω||2 + 1
pl
∑
j
ξj − ρ
subject to (ω · Φ(ν¯(tj))) ≥ ρ− ξj , ξj ≤ 0
(15)
where p is a constant parameter in the range of (0, 1), denoting
the false positive rate of the decision boundary that classifies
normal and anomalous sensor readings. Decision variables ω
in model (15) define the most generalizable linear decision
boundary in an infinite-dimensional space (created by the
Gaussian kernel) to determine a region in the input space
that encompasses at least 1 − p percentage of data points.
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Fig. 2: Distribution (PDF) of normal |ν¯(tk)| and the absolute value of unknown
abnormal data. The shaded area indicates false positive beyond the threshold γ.
Decision variables ξj are slack variables introduced to penalize
the degree of violation of the constraint (ω · Φ(ν¯(tj))) ≥ ρ.
According to Proposition 3 in [10], parameter p provides an
upper bound on the fraction of outliers in the training dataset,
and asymptotically equals the fraction of outliers out-of-
sample, with probability 1, under certain conditions. We train
M different OCSVM models, each model with a parameter p
selected from the set {p1, p2, ..., pM} with pi < pj ,∀i < j.
For a measurement sequence with dimension m, we compute
the average of the normalized innovation sequence over a
window of N time intervals, up to time tk,
ν¯(tk)avr = | 1
N
k∑
i=k−N+1
ν¯(ti)|1, (16)
where | · |1 is the L1-norm. For small values of ν¯(tk)avr,
i.e., when the average of normalized innovation within the
current time window is small, suggesting that AEKF performs
well, we choose a trained OCSVM model with large value of
p to ensure that we would detect even small variations and
mark them as outliers. Following the same line of logic, when
ν¯(tk)avr is large, we choose an OCSVM model with small p
to avoid unnecessary dismissal of data points where we are
not certain enough that a point is truly an outlier. To that
end, in order to determine the parameter p properly, we use
the histogram of innovation values constructed from normal
data to approximate the distribution of the innovation. Without
loss of generality, we assume ν(tk) is zero mean Gaussian
distributed. For the case when it is not zero mean, we first
subtract the mean value, and add it back after determining the
value of p.
The tail of the probability density function (PDF) in figure
2 represents drastic changes in data, and the center of the
PDF represents smooth changes. The histogram of |ν¯| is an
approximation of the PDF of the normal training data. As
shown in figure 2, parameter γ controls the area of the shadow,
and the PDF of the normal data is approximated by the
histogram. We assume the absolute value of normal data as a
random variable denoted as X with a certain distribution and
domain D(X). Then, given the number of training samples
Ntrain, the number of outliers Nol can be computed from
Nol = p ·Ntrain
=
|{x : 1− F (x) = p}|mode
|{x : x ∈ D(x)}|mode ×Ntrain
≈ |{ν¯ : |ν¯|1 ≥ γ}|mode
Ntrain
×Ntrain
(17)
where F (·) is the CDF of X . As such, we have:
|{ν¯ : |ν¯|1 ≥ γ}|mode ≈ p ·Ntrain. (18)
Finally, for M OCSVM models with parameters
{p1, p2, ..., pM}, when testing on a new data point, we
have:
ν¯(tk)avr ∈ [0, γ1)⇒ p1
ν¯(tk)avr ∈ [γ1, γ2)⇒ p2
...
ν¯(tk)avr ∈ [γM−1, inf)⇒ pM
(19)
In summary, assuming we have n measurements, figure
3 summaries an implementation flowchart of the proposed
algorithm, which combines AEKF and OCSVM to detect
anomalies and recover the corrupt sensor readings. Specif-
ically, at each time epoch, the following vehicle receives
the measurements from both the leading vehicle and its own
onboard sensors. The AEKF smooths the following vehicle’s
speed and location signal based on the motion model. Mean-
while the AEKF generates the innovation, which measures
the discrepancy between the measurements and the prediction,
and sends the innovation to the fault detector model for
anomaly detection. The fault detector model consists of several
OCSVM models and it can dynamically choose which one to
use based on the average innovation. If there is no sensor
anomaly detected, the innovation will be combined with the
measurement at current time in order to generate an estimation.
Otherwise, we do not trust the current sensor measurement and
replace the estimation with the prediction, which will be used
in the next time epoch.
E. Anomaly Model
The dataset for this study is generated by randomly adding
anomalies to normal trajectory data, since there is no publicly
available dataset on CAV trajectories that includes anomalies
in sensor measurements. Specifically, we account for the four
major anomaly types including short, noise, bias, and gradual
drift. The detailed construction of the anomalies are as follows:
1) Short: The short anomaly type is simulated as a random
Gaussian variable with mean and variance of 0 and c1,
respectively.
2) Noise: The noise anomaly type is simulated as a se-
quence of i.i.d. random Gaussian variables with length
of l, mean of 0, and variance of c2.
3) Bias: The bias anomaly type is simulated as adding a
temporarily offset to the observation. We simulate the
magnitude of the anomaly as Gaussian distributed with
mean of 0 and variance of c3. The duration of the
sequence of bias anomaly is l.
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Fig. 3: Implementation flowchart of the proposed algorithm.
4) Gradual Drift: The gradual drift anomaly type is sim-
ulated by adding a linearly increasing/decreasing set of
values to the base values of the sensors. Specifically, first
we use a vector of linearly increasing values from 0 to
m, where m is a uniformly distributed random variable
in range of [0, c4]. The duration of the sequence is l. We
then use a Bernoulli random variable with probability 12
to generate one of the two outcomes of 1 and -1, by
which we scale the sequence to generate increasing or
decreasing drift, respectively.
Here ci, i = {1, 2, 3, 4} is the parameter of distribution for
each type of anomaly.
We inject all four types of anomalies into each sensor read-
ing. We assume the onset of anomalous values in sensors occur
independently. That is, we do not explicitly train OCSVM on a
dataset containing interdependent sensor failures or systemic
cyber attacks on vehicle sensors. However, this assumption
does not preclude scenarios under which multiple sensors are
under simultaneous attack.
Similar to our previous work [7], we generate various
datasets for our experiments with anomaly rate of α. In
addition, we simulate anomalies to start at randomly selected
times, lasting for random durations (if it applies to the anomaly
type), affecting randomly selected sensors. These anomalies
are then used to adjust the corresponding sensors’ normal
readings in the original dataset, which indicate the traveling
location and speed of the CAV, making them anomalous. The
pseudo code describing random generation of anomalies is
presented in Algorithm 1. In the algorithm, randi(L) denotes
a discrete uniform distribution among integer numbers from
1 to L. Note that each anomaly type is equally likely to get
selected when an anomaly is generated.
Algorithm 1 Anomaly Generation Process
1: α ← anomaly rate; n ← number of sensors; ζ =
[ζ1, ζ2, ..., ζn]← U(0, 1); L← maximum duration of anomaly
2: for time epoch t ∈ T do
3: for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} do
4: if no anomaly exists at t for the ith sensor then
5: if ζi ≤ α then
6: l← randi(L)
7: switch (Anomaly type selected according to probabil-
ity distribution fω)
8: case Short:
9: Add ‘short’ type of anomaly with parameter c1
10: case Noise:
11: Add ‘noise’ type of anomaly with duration l with
parameter c2
12: case Bias:
13: Add ‘bias’ type of anomaly with duration l with
parameter c3
14: case Gradual Drift:
15: Add ‘gradual drift’ type of anomaly with duration
l with parameter c4
16: end switch
17: end if
18: end if
19: end for
20: end for
IV. CASE STUDY BASED ON THE INTELLIGENT DRIVER
MODEL
In this section we use a well-known car-following model,
namely the Intelligent Driver Model (IDM), proposed by
Treiber et al. [40], to compare the anomaly detection per-
formance of the traditional χ2-detector and the OCSVM
model. As mentioned in [34], since the IDM has no explicit
reaction time and its driving behavior is given in terms of a
continuously differentiable acceleration function, it describes
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more closely the characteristics of semi-automated driving
by adaptive cruise control (ACC) than that of a human
driver. However, it can easily be extended to capture the
communication delay as described in previous section. We also
evaluate the impact of using the IDM motion model on the
anomaly detection performance. In order to evaluate system
performance, we assume that the input vector containing the
leading vehicle’s information is not anomalous.
Using the definition of state sn(t) and input un(t) in the
previous section, the IDM model with time delay τ can be
described as the following:
x˙n(t) = vn(t)
v˙n(t) = fvc(sn(t− τ), un(t− τ))
= a
(
1−
(
vn(t− τ)
v0
)δ
−
(
s∗(vn(t− τ), vn(t− τ)− vn−1(t− τ))
xn−1(t− τ)− xn(t− τ)− ln
)2)
with
s∗(vn,∆vn) = s0 + vnT +
vn∆vn
2
√
ab
where a, b, δ, v0, s0, T and ln are model parameters. The state
vector sn and the input vector un both have dimension of 2.
For detailed information on IDM refer to [40]. Following the
typical parameter values of city traffic used in [34], we set
the parameter values in our study as follows: a = 1.0, b =
1.5, δ = 4, v0 = 33.75, s0 = 2, T = 1.0, ln = 5, and define
the measurement function h(·) as:
h(s) = H · s =
[
1, 0
0, 1
]
· s.
The data for this study is obtained from the research data
exchange (RDE) database constructed as part of the Safety
Pilot Model Deployment (SPMD) program [41] funded by the
US department of Transportation, and collected in Michigan.
This program was conducted with the primary objective of
demonstrating CAVs, with the emphasis on implementing and
testing V2V and V2I communications technologies in real-
world conditions. The program recorded detailed and high-
frequency (10 Hz) data for more than 2,500 vehicles over
a period of two years. The data features extracted from the
SPMD dataset used in this study include the in-vehicle speed
for one of the test vehicles with a trip length of 400 seconds
(4000 samples) for training data, and 200 seconds (2000
samples) for testing data. As mentioned in section I, we
assume that the vehicles are in ACC mode according to a car-
following model, i.e. the IDM model. Therefore, as shown
in figure 4, we use the extracted speed data as the leading
vehicle’s speed vn−1, and generate its location xn−1 and the
following vehicle’s state (xn and vn) as the baseline based on
Fig. 4: The synthetic car-following data using SPDP data under IDM model. The first
and second plot are the speed and location of two vehicles respectively.
the following rules:
xn−1(k + 1) = xn−1(k) + vn−1(k) · τ
xn(k + 1) = xn(k) + vn(k) · τ
vn(k + 1) =
∆t · f (xn(k − τ), vn(k − τ), xn−1(k − τ), vn−1(k − τ))
+ vn(k − τ) +  · τ
(20)
where  is a random term that describes the uncertainty of
the following vehicle’s state. In our study we generate  based
on a uniformly distributed random variable within the range
[−0.1, 0.1]. Furthermore, we add Gaussian white noise with
variance 0.02 to the leading vehicle’s baseline data. Since
we want to test the detection performance, the noise variance
should be smaller than the anomaly variance so that it would
not be overpowered by the white noise. Note that adding white
noise to the leading vehicle’s baseline data is equivalent to
using a Gaussian distributed random time delay factor of τ˜
with mean τ .
To demonstrate the importance of incorporating the leading
vehicle’s information into the following vehicle’s anomaly
detection procedure, we implement our framework once using
the IDM car following model, and once without it, using the
state-space model expressed in the following:
s˙n(t) =
[
eT2 · sn(t− τ)
0
]
+ θ(t)
zn(tk) = Hsn(tk) + η(tk), k ∈ {0 ∪ Z+}
(21)
where the process noise θ(t) accounts for the introduced error.
To measure the effectiveness of our two main contributions,
i.e., incorporating a car following model into the AEKF
motion model and using a OCSVM fault detector, we con-
duct sensitivity analysis over the motion model (i.e., with
and without the IDM motion model), the anomaly detection
methodology (i.e., the χ2-detector and OCSVM), and the time
delay (i.e., τ = {0, 0.5, 1.5}). To evaluate the impact of
changing models/parameters, we compute the Area Under the
Curve (AUC) for each receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
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curve. The ROC curve is a graphical plot tool to illustrate the
diagnostic ability of a binary classifier as its discrimination
threshold is varied, and is created by plotting the true positive
rate (sensitivity) against the false positive rate (1− specificity)
at various threshold settings. More specifically, we change
the values of σ in our χ2-detector, and the γ vector for the
OCSVM. Note that the vector γ is a three-dimensional vector
as we train and utilize four different OCSVM models.
The experiments are separately implemented into three
scenarios, where scenario 1 contains a χ2-detector without the
IDM motion model, scenario 2 contains the χ2-detector with
the IDM model, and scenario 3 contains OCSVM with IDM
model. Each scenario is implemented under three experiment
settings generated by varying the value of the anomaly param-
eter ci, i = {1, 2, 3, 4}. More specifically, values of ci = 1,
ci = 0.1, and ci = 0.05 are used for settings 1, 2 and 3,
respectively. This suggests anomalous readings become more
subtle, and generally more difficult to detect, from setting 1
to setting 3. Lastly, the maximum duration of anomaly, L, is
set to 20 for each setting.
Tables I-III present the AUC values of the three scenarios
in our three experiment settings, with time delays of τ = 0,
0.5, and 1.5 seconds, respectively. The experiments indicate
that the IDM observer-based fault detection method provides
significant improvement (up to 23%) compared with the per-
formance of AEKF without the IDM model, regardless of the
value of time delay. Additionally, we can see that OCSVM
consistently achieves a better fault detection performance than
the χ2 detector. Results also indicate that there is a degeneracy
of performance for each method as the parameter ci becomes
smaller. This observation is in line with intuition, since smaller
ci makes the anomaly more subtle and therefore harder to
detect. Additionally, the trends of AUC values indicate that as
we increase the time delay, the overall detection performance
systemically deteriorates. This suggests that the time delay of
the car-following model may have a negative impact on the
detection performance.
TABLE I: AUC OF THREE SCENARIOS WITH τ = 0 SECOND.
χ2 without IDM χ2 with IDM OCSVM with IDM
ci = 1 0.9059 0.9723 0.9806
ci = 0.1 0.7764 0.9453 0.9470
ci = 0.05 0.7294 0.9228 0.9357
TABLE II: AUC OF THREE SCENARIOS WITH τ = 0.5 SECOND.
χ2 without IDM χ2 with IDM OCSVM with IDM
ci = 1 0.9024 0.9703 0.9793
ci = 0.1 0.7637 0.9402 0.9452
ci = 0.05 0.7258 0.9118 0.9260
TABLE III: AUC OF THREE SCENARIOS WITH τ = 1.5 SECOND.
χ2 without IDM χ2 with IDM OCSVM with IDM
ci = 1 0.8939 0.9701 0.9782
ci = 0.1 0.7681 0.9201 0.9294
ci = 0.05 0.7208 0.8875 0.8940
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes an anomaly detection method to protect
CAVs against anomalous sensor readings and/or malicious
cyber attacks. We use an adaptive extended Kalman filter,
informed by not only the vehicle’s onboard sensors but also
the leading vehicle’s trajectory, in order to detect anomalous
information. The well-known IDM car following model is
used to incorporate the leading vehicle’s information into
AEKF. Lastly, to improve the anomaly detection performance,
and given the fact that using AEKF the innovation is not
normally-distributed, we replace the traditionally used χ2-
detector with an OCSVM model. We quantify the effect of
these contributions in isolation, as well as in a combined
model, by conducting experiments under three scenarios: (i)
χ2-detector without the IDM model, (ii) χ2-detector with the
IDM model, and (iii), OCSVM with the IDM model. Results
show that the AEKF enhanced with OCSVM and the IDM
model outperforms the traditional χ2-detector-based anomaly
detection used in conjunction with AEKF. Furthermore, our
results indicate that a model-based anomaly detection method
that can incorporate the status of the lead vehicle can fur-
ther improve the detection performance. More specifically,
by utilizing the leading vehicle’s information to inform the
AEKF and using OCSVM for anomaly detection, the proposed
method can not only effectively filter out the sensor noise in
CAVs, but also detect the anomalous sensor values in real-time
with better performance than that without utilizing leading
vehicle’s information. This high performance is showcased by
high AUC values in our experiments. Moreover, we study the
general relationship between the delay in receiving information
and the performance of anomaly detection. We show that as the
time delay of signal transmission (i.e., communication channel
delay or sensor delay) becomes larger, the overall detection
performance deteriorates.
The current study can be improved/expanded in multiple
ways. First, the following vehicle’s state and anomalous sensor
values used in section IV are simulated, due to the paucity of
ACC datasets with anomalies for CAVs. There exist multi-
ple car-following datasets, but most of them were collected
from human drivers. Although our study mainly focuses on
the detection performance of our proposed method, it may
be beneficial to directly collect ACC data from CAVs and
calibrate the car-following model based on a real dataset,
since the potential discrepancy between the car following
model and the true traveling behaviour of the vehicle may
introduce new challenges. Second, in section IV, we assume
the input vector containing leading vehicle’s information is
not anomalous. However, our proposed method can still detect
anomalies without such an assumption, i.e., as long as the
discrepancy between input vector and measurement are large
enough. Note that we also assume that anomalous input vector
are caused either by sensor failures or false injection attacks
that can be described by four types of anomaly. Third, in
this study for each vehicle we only utilize a single leading
vehicle’s information, whereas a connected vehicle can benefit
from information shared by any number of connected vehicles
within its communication range as well as the infrastructure. In
our future work, we plan to study the impact of incorporating
multiple sources of information (e.g., multiple vehicles or
RSUs) on the overall anomaly detection performance. Fur-
thermore, we plan to expand our work to identify the source
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of anomaly after detection.
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